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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On Friday, July 8, 1988, Mr. Luebcke, of 
Progressive Printing met with Mr. Guy Davis ("Davis") of William 
Cooper Winery, Inc. ("W.C. Winery") regarding the printing of a 
prospectus. It was understood by Mr. Luebcke from the beginning 
that the printing was to be done for Mr. Davis of William Cooper 
Winery. (Trans. 46). 
2. At the July 8, 1988 meeting, Mr. Davis unveiled a 
project totally different than the $500.00 project discussed with 
Renae of BS&H ("BS&H") over the phone. These changes were 
substantial and increased the $500.00 order to a $4,000.00 
project. (Trans. 21-27). 
3. Charles Brown was not present at this meeting on 
July 8, 1988, when Mr. Luebcke discussed the $4,000.00 project 
with Mr. Davis of W.C. Winery. Charles Brown was never informed 
of these changes. (Trans. 47). At this meeting, Mr. Luebcke was 
told to proceed on the $4,000.00 project by Mr. Guy Davis of W.C. 
Winery. (Trans. 23 and 46, 47). 
4. At the July 8, 1988 meeting, Mr. Leubcke discussed 
with Mr. Davis and made all arrangements for the printing as to 
the time, quantity, and costs. This was arranged directly 
between Mr. Luebcke and the client, Davis of W.C. Winery, without 
iii 
the knowledge or consent of Charles Brown or BS&H. (Trans. 22, 
52, 57). 
5. Over the weekend, without the consent, 
authorization or knowledge of Charles Brown, or anyone of BS&H, 
Mr. Leubcke took it upon himself to contact Mr. Kermit Johnson of 
Alphagraphics and placed an order with the Plaintiff for the 
printing. (Trans. 47). It was Progressive Printing, not Charles 
Brown or BS&H that contacted the Plaintiff, Alphagraphics and 
placed the order for the printing. (Trans. 47; Affidavit of Jim 
Luebcke, paragraph 4). 
6. Based upon the order placed by Progressive 
Printing, the majority of the work was performed by Alphagraphics 
over the weekend without the knowledge, consent, or any agreement 
from Charles Brown or BS&H, (Trans. 50) and prior to any meeting 
with Jeffrey Brown of BS&H. (Trans. 23). During the weekend, 
Mr. Leubcke and Mr. Johnson did not know who would be responsible 
for the bill. (Trans. 27). 
7. There was no writing or agreement from Charles 
Brown or BS&H that BS&H would be responsible for the bill. 
8. After the majority of the work had been performed, 
on Monday morning July 11, 1988, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Leubcke 
contacted Jeffrey Brown to make an appointment to go over some 
matters regarding the layout of the prospectus. (Trans. 61). It 
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was very, very important to Mr. Johnson and Mr. Leubcke to have 
BS&H responsible for the bill and not the client. (Trans. 62). 
9. At this meeting on July 11, 1988, questions were 
asked and answered regarding the layout of the prospectus. 
(Trans. 87). There was no discussion regarding the terms of a 
contract including time, quantity, price, or terms of payment. 
(Trans. 98). Towards the end of the meeting, it was asked if 
Jeffrey Brown should be contacted with any further questions to 
which Jeffrey Brown responded that Charles Brown should be 
contacted. (Trans. 88). 
10. Jeffrey Brown testified that he never stated that 
Charles Brown would be responsible for the order but rather that 
it was represented to him by one of the printers that Charles 
Brown had told them he would be responsible for the order. 
(Trans. 92). Alphagraphics, on the other hand, claims that 
Jeffrey Brown said that Charles Brown would be responsible for 
the order. It is undisputed that Jeffrey Brown never stated that 
BS&H would be responsible for the order. (Trans. 54). At the 
end of the July 11, 1988 meeting, Alphagraphics still had no 
written or signed invoice indicating that BS&H would be 
responsible for the order. 
11. It is also undisputed, contrary to the court's 
findings, that Mr. Davis of W.C. Winery, who had made 
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arrangements for the printing and who had directed Mr. Leubcke to 
proceed with the order, was not present at the July 11, 1988 
meeting, (Trans. 25, 26, and 61). 
12. Upon completion of the order, the material was 
delivered to the client, Mr. Davis of W.C. Winery. (Trans. 54 
and 66). BS&H was not notified concerning the completion of the 
order. (Trans. 57). 
13. The invoice sent to the address of BS&H states 
"Attention: Charles Brown and Guy Davis", thus, Alphagraphics 
never billed BS&H but sought payment from Charles Brown and Guy 
Davis personally. (Exhibit P-l). Alphagraphics thus expected 
payment from the client Davis and BS&H could not have failed to 
tell Alphagraphics it was seeking payment from the wrong party. 
14. After the first day of trial the trial court 
dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint against Charles Brown, 
individually. The court found that there was no contract or 
meeting of the minds between BS&H and the Plaintiff after the 
original $500.00 quote had turned into a substantially different 
$4,000.00 order. (Trans. 74-75). The court also found no 
authority on the part of Jeffrey Brown to orally bind Charles 
Brown to the order. (Trans. 76). The court further stated that 
any conversations with Charles Brown regarding the order was not 
ratification of any alleged contract. (Trans. 78). 
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15. The only statement in dispute was whether Jeffrey 
Brown stated that Charles Brown would be responsible. The fact 
Jeffrey Brown never stated BS&H would be responsible was not in 
dispute. (Trans. 54). The court, however, found that it could 
be implied that BS&H would be responsible for the bill and not 
Charles Brown if Jeffrey Brown stated at the July 11, 1988 
meeting that Charles Brown would be responsible with the client, 
Mr. Guy Davis being present and agreeing to this. (Trans. 76). 
16. At the end of the second day of trial, the court 
found against BS&H because Jeffrey Brown said Charles Brown would 
be responsible for the bill at the July 11, 1988 meeting with Guy 
Davis present and because BS&H did not adequately deny 
responsibility for the invoice and inform Plaintiff it was 
billing the wrong people. (Trans. 142 - 144). 
17. The court erroneously found Guy Davis was present 
at the July 11, 1988 meeting (Trans. 143) and contrary to its 
prior ruling, found that the phone conversations with Charles 
Brown was an acceptance or ratification of the contract. (Trans. 
143 to 144). 
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III. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court found against BS&H even though the undisputed 
evidence, marshalled on behalf of the Plaintiff, shows that 
Alphagraphics is not entitled to judgment against BS&H. The 
undisputed facts show that there was no meeting of the minds 
between Alphagraphics and BS&H regarding the $4,000.00 project. 
Further, the order placed with Alphagraphics was placed by Mr. 
Leubcke of Progressive Printing and not BS&H. Furthermore, when 
Mr. Luebcke placed the $4,000.00 order with Alphagraphics over 
the weekend, he knew he had only discussed a $500.00 order with 
BS&H, which could be handled by Progressive Printing. Mr. 
Luebcke was given the order and direction to proceed on the 
$4,000.00 order by the client Davis of W.C. Winery and not by 
BS&H. The work on the order was performed over the weekend 
before there was any meeting with anyone of BS&H and at the 
Monday morning meeting with Jeffrey Brown of BS&H, the undisputed 
evidence shows that he did not state that the law firm of BS&H 
would be responsible for the bill. There is no express contract 
between the plaintiff and BS&H. 
The court, however, stated that BS&H could be 
responsible for the bill through implication. (Trans. 76). The 
court found against BS&H based upon their actions, by the 
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implications, and by their response after the merchandise was 
delivered, that BS&H accepted the contract. (Trans. 144). The 
undisputed evidence in this case is insufficient to find an 
implied contract or ratification of any alleged contract by BS&H. 
Finally, in addition, the trial court made contradictory and 
clearly erroneous errors in its finding of an implied contract or 
ratification of a contract. Therefore, there can be no implied 
contract or ratification by BS&H, and judgment against the law 




BS&H HAS MARSHALLED ALL OF THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS; THE EVIDENCE IS LEGALLY 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS. 
Alphagraphics argues that BS&H has not marshalled all 
of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings. 
However, BS&H has stated the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the Plaintiff in the undisputed facts. Based upon the 
undisputed facts and evidence, even in light most favorable to 
the Plaintiff, it is legally insufficient to support the court's 
findings. 
For example, the evidence is undisputed that there is 
no writing or invoice signed by BS&H for the printing. It is 
also undisputed that the order placed with the Plaintiff was by 
Mr. Leubcke of Progressive Printing, who was given the direction 
to proceed with the order by Mr. Davis of W.C. Winery without the 
knowledge or consent of BS&H. In fact, the court previously held 
that there was no contract or meeting of the minds between 
Alphagraphics and BS&H regarding the $4,000.00 order. 
Additionally, the work was done by Alphagraphics over the 
weekend, without the knowledge of or any writing or agreement 
from BS&H. This was prior to the July 11, 1988, meeting with 
Jeffrey Brown of BS&H. 
1 
The undisputed evidence is that Jeffrey Brown never 
stated in the July 11, 1988, meeting that BS&H would be 
responsible for the order. Moreover, contrary to the findings of 
the court, the undisputed evidence is that Mr. Davis of W.C. 
Winery was not present at this meeting. This was a major factor 
in the court's determination. (Trans. 143). Upon completion of 
the order, the material was never delivered to BS&H, nor was BS&H 
notified at the time, but rather the material was delivered 
directly to the client, Guy Davis. This was another major factor 
in the court's decision. (Trans. 144). These points raised by 
BS&H are not in dispute. 
The trial court's findings are contrary to the 
undisputed evidence and are clearly erroneous and against the 
clear weight of the evidence. Therefore, the findings of fact 
must be overturned. Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P. 2d 917 (Utah App. 
1989). Under the clearly erroneous standard of review, the 
Appellate Court will set aside fact findings if they are against 
the clear weight of the evidence or if the Appellate Court 
otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made. Monrock, Inc. v. Sidwell, 770 P.2d 1022 (Utah 
App. 1989); Southern Title Guarantee Company, Inc. v. Bethers, 
761 P.2d 951 (Utah App. 1988); Cove View Excavation Construction 
Company v. Flynn, 758 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1988); Backer v. 
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Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah App. 1987); Schindler v. Schindler 
776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989). These erroneous findings were 
relied upon by the court in finding an acceptance or ratification 
of the contract by BS&H. Therefore, the court's findings must be 
set aside and judgment overturned on appeal. Matter of estate of 
Kesler, 702 P.2d 86 (Utah 1985); Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah 
Venture Number 1, 645 P.2d 608 (Utah 1982). 
ARGUMENT II 
THE STATEMENT OF FACTS BY BS&H CORRECTLY REFLECTS THE 
TESTIMONY AT TRIAL. 
BS&H's statement of facts correctly reflects the 
testimony at trial and are properly referenced to the transcript. 
Alphagraphic's claim that the statement of facts are a mis-
characterization is incorrect and, at best, is a frivolous 
attempt by the Plaintiff to seek attorney's fees. 
BS&H's Statement of Fact number 9 is a correct 
reflection of the testimony of Mr. Leubcke. All arrangements for 
printing were arranged directly between Mr. Leubcke and the 
client, Mr. Davis of W.C. Winery. (See transcript at pages 52, 
57, and 22). The cite to paragraph 47 is in reference to the 
fact that this information was never discussed and agreed upon by 
Charles Brown, which is also indicated in BS&H's Statement of 
Fact number 9. Furthermore, this discussion should not simply be 
superceded by the Monday, July 11th meeting with Jeffrey Brown, 
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as argued by Plaintiff. It was the meeting with Guy Davis on 
July 8, 1988 which was the basis of the $4,000.00 contract upon 
which the work was performed. It was the client, Davis, who 
directed Mr. Leubcke to proceed with the $4,000.00 order. The 
court found that there was no contract or meeting of the minds 
between BS&H and the Plaintiff on the $4,000.00 order. This 
cannot be simply overlooked. If there is an express contract 
with the client, Davis, the Plaintiff would have a legal remedy 
against Davis and it would preclude this court's finding of an 
implied contract between the Plaintiff and BS&H. An implied 
contract is an equitable remedy which should not be imposed by 
the court unless the plaintiff has exhausted all his legal 
remedies. Knight v. Post, 748 P.2d 1097 (Utah App. 1988). 
In reference to paragraph 11 of BS&H's Statement of 
Facts, Mr. Leubcke testified that he assumed that he had a 
contract with Charles Brown but was not sure as to who would be 
responsible and for this reason the July 11, 1989 meeting was set 
up. (Trans. 48). Alphagraphic?s statement that Mr. Leubcke had 
just testified that he obviously believed the law firm would be 
responsible because it made the order is a mis-characterization 
in itself. This statement is made without any reference to the 
transcript. Mr. Leubcke testified that the order was placed, and 
he was told to proceed by the client, Davis of W.C. Winery and 
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not BS&H. (Trans. 23 and 46). In fact, Charles Brown was not 
present at this meeting. (Trans. 46 and 47). Mr. Leubcke's 
statement that he proceeded on faith shows that he understood the 
client to be responsible, and he knew at the time he had no 
contract with or reason to believe that BS&H would be 
responsible. At any rate, this is a question of interpretation 
and not in violation of Rule 24(k) of the Utah Rules of Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
In reference to BS&H's Statement of Fact number 13, the 
testimony and evidence is clear that Mr. Johnson and Mr. Leubcke 
did call Monday morning to set up an appointment with Jeffrey 
Brown. (Trans. 61 and 86). Mr. Johnson testified on page 61 as 
follows: 
Question: What did happen? 
Answer: We called the firm of BS&H to be told that Mr. 
Brown had been called out-of-town and at that 
point a meeting was set up. I don't recall 
whether we told then that Charles Brown was called 
out-of-town, I just know that a meeting was set up 
at 3:00 that afternoon in the firm's office. 
In reference to BS&H's Statement of Fact no. 15, W.C. 
Winery was the client of Charles Brown. The time spent on W.C. 
Winery by Jeffrey Brown was at the request of Charles Brown. 
W.C. Winery was not the client of Jeffrey Brown and Jeffrey Brown 
was in no position to discuss the terms of a contract for the 
printing of the prospectus at the July 11, 1988 meeting. This 
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was known to plaintiff. Charles Brown was the attorney who had 
knowledge regarding the printing and that was only for a quote on 
the $500.00 order. Jeffrey Brown was simply there to answer 
legal questions regarding the layout of the prospectus. Jeffrey 
Brown's testimony is that there was no discussion at the meeting 
regarding the terms of the contract including time, quantity, or 
price. (Trans. 91-98). Therefore, this cannot be a mis-
characterization of the record. 
In relation to BS&H's Statement of Fact no. 19, the 
evidence and testimony is clear that upon completion of the job, 
the material was delivered directly to the client, Davis, without 
any notification to BS&H. (Trans. 54). If BS&H would have been 
notified or if BS&H would have received the materials and told it 
would be responsible for payment, it could have held the material 
for payment. The delivery of the material to the client verified 
the fact that the plaintiff is dealing directly with Davis of 
W.C. Winery on the order. The fact that an invoice was later 
sent to the attention of "Guy Davis and Charles Brown," does not 
constitute notification to BS&H that the job was complete. At 
any rate, this notification would have been sent after the 
material had already been delivered directly to the client. 
In relation to BS&Hfs Statement of Fact no. 20, the 
invoice was not sent to the attention of BS&H but to "Guy Davis 
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and Charles C. Brown". (Exhibit P-l). BS&H's Statement of Fact 
no. 20 says nothing about the address where the invoice was sent, 
it states "it was not sent to the attention of BS&H but to "Guy 
Davis and Charles C. Brown1". Alphagraphics mischaracterizes 
BS&H's Statement of Fact no. 20. It is undisputed that the 
invoice was sent to the attention of "Guy Davis and Charles C. 
Brown" and not BS&H. This shows the plaintiff's understanding 
that it was Guy Davis or Charles C. Brown who was responsible for ' 
the order and not BS&H. This is important since BS&H's alleged 
failure to respond to this invoice is the only basis for 
liability of BS&H at this point. 
ARGUMENT III 
THE COURT FOUND AGAINST BS&H BASED UPON THE MEETING 
WITH JEFFREY BROWN AND THE FACT THAT MR. DAVIS WAS 
PRESENT IN THIS MEETING; THEREFORE, THIS MISTAKE BY THE 
TRIAL COURT CANNOT BE CONSIDERED HARMLESS ERROR. 
Although the trial court dismissed Charles Brown 
individually from the suit, finding that Jeffrey Brown could not 
orally bind Charles Brown, the court did not dismiss BS&H, the 
court stated: 
Now, as to the firm, the other defendant, BS&H, this...the 
Court feels is a more difficult question. Again, from the 
evidence, which is before the Court at this point, Mr. 
Jeffrey Brown is an officer of that corporation and has the 
power under the law to bind the corporation as an officer. 
While he does not expressly say BS&H will be responsible, 
nevertheless, at his instigation these individuals all meet 
in his office. When the question is asked, who will be 
responsible, with the client present, Mr. Guy Davis being 
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present and no testimony of any response from him, as to my 
company will be responsible or 1 will be responsible; rather 
Mr. Jeffrey Brown responds by saying "Charlie is". 
And the Court finds that this all comes from this - this 
meeting where Jeffrey Brown says, "Charlie is". And the 
court indicated, I think this is a much more difficult 
question; but that -- that response, the court feels, 
certainly would give plaintiffs the reason to believe that 
the corporation is also responsible in this matter. 
And so the Motion to Dismiss as to the law firm is denied. 
(Trans. 76-77, emphasis added). 
The court did not dismiss the complaint against BS&H 
because the court felt that it could be implied from the actions 
of Jeffrey Brown that the law firm would be responsible by 
stating that Charles Brown would be responsible in this meeting 
with the client present. The basis of the court's finding 
liability against BS&H is based on the erroneous finding that the 
client, Guy Davis, was present in this meeting and allowed BS&H 
to direct the work. This would therefore give Alphagraphics 
reason to believe that Jeffrey Brown knew of the arrangements 
discussed previously between Mr. Davis and Mr. Luebcke and that 
BS&H was now directing the work for Mr. Davis and that Charles 
Brown would be responsible rather than the client. (Trans. 77 
and 143). This finding by the trial court is clearly an error 
and constitutes reversible error. 
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ARGUMENT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A STATEMENT THAT AN 
INDIVIDUAL WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR A BILL IS BINDING ON 
A CORPORATION. 
While Jeffrey Brown disputes ever saying that Charles 
Brown would be responsible for the bill, it is undisputed by both 
parties that Jeffrey Brown never stated that BS&H would be 
responsible for the bill. (Trans. 54). Even accepting 
plaintiff's allegations as true, that is, that Jeffrey Brown 
stated that Charles Brown would be responsible for the bill, this 
does not bind BS&H. Alphagraphics argues that while Jeffrey 
Brown had no authority to bind Charles Brown, he did have 
authority to bind BS&H. However, the undisputed testimony is 
that Jeffrey Brown never stated that BS&H would be responsible. 
Nor was any evidence offered by the plaintiff that it relied upon 
this statement or that plaintiff inferred from this statement 
that the law firm of BS&H, rather than Charles Brown, would be 
liable. Therefore, although Jeffrey Brown may have had authority 
to bind BS&H, he never did. Therefore, the trial court could not 
have found an express contract between Alphagraphics and BS&H and 
any finding of an express contract would be clearly erroneous and 
should be overturned. The trial court cannot simply ignore the 
law of contracts and hold that the statement, "Charles Brown will 
be responsible" means that BS&H will be responsible. 
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Contrary to the assertions of Alphagraphics, the 
evidence is clear that it was the client, Guy Davis, who 
requested the work on the $4,000.00 order. In fact, the court 
found that there was no contract or meeting of the minds between 
BS&H and Alphagraphics on the $4,000.00 order. The evidence is 
also clear that the work was picked-up by Guy Davis and not BS&H. 
It would not be grossly unfair nor sanction fraud to 
hold that the alleged statement that Charles Brown would be 
responsible was insufficient to bind BS&H. It would merely 
require the plaintiff to obtain an express agreement that BS&H 
would be responsible in a writing or at least a signature 
indicating such or else seek payment from the client who ordered 
the product and directed the work on the product and also 
received the materials or benefit of the product. The fact that 
Mr. Luebcke now claims he though BS&H would be responsible based 
upon an alleged statement that Charles Brown would be 
responsible, was not reasonable and in error and should not be 
dispositive, BS&H should not be liable based upon his claimed 
misunderstanding or wishful thinking. This would create an a 
nillity of the law of contracts. It would be grossly unfair to 
BS&H to hold them liable for a contract that they never entered 
into. 
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The case of City Electric v. Dean Evans Chrysler 
Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89 (Utah 1983) relied upon by Alphagraphics to 
show ratification was reversed by the Utah Supreme Court, which 
found no ratification or acceptance of the invoices, although in 
City Electric two of the invoices were actually paid. I^d. at 91. 
In the present case, as set forth in the opening brief of the 
appellants (p. 23-29), there was no acceptance of the invoice by 
BS&H. The testimony clearly shows that no payments were made on 
the invoice by BS&H. The mere fact that an invoice is sent to a 
corporation upon which no action is taken is not sufficient for 
ratification. Ratification of a contract not only requires a 
knowledge of all material facts, reliance and a direct receipt of 
the benefits, none of which are present in this case, but it 
requires the corporation to recognize or act in acceptance or 
adoption. Bank of Santa Fe v. Honeyboy Haven, Inc., 746 P.2d 
1116 (N. Mex. 1987). Under the facts in this case viewed in 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, BS&H could not have 
accepted the invoice. There can be no ratification. Phoenix 
Western Holding Corp. v. Gleason, 500 P.2d 320 (Ariz. App. 1972). 
Lack of protest and mere passage of time alone does not 
constitute ratification. Burton v. Automatic Welding & Supply 
Corp., 513 P.2d 1122 (Ala. 1973); Atlas Building Supply Co., Inc. 
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v. First Independent Bank of Vancouver, 500 P.2d 26 (Wash. App. 
1976). 
ARGUMENT V 
THE TRIAL COURT MADE INCONSISTENT FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
RULINGS ON RATIFICATION. 
The trial court clearly made inconsistent findings of 
fact and rulings on ratification. It should be noted that the 
first day of trial occurred on July 18, 1989, the second day of 
trial was not until nearly a month afterwards on August 9, 1989. 
Alphagraphics argues that the rulings were separate that one had 
to do with Charles Brown and the other with BS&H. However, this 
is not the case. The alleged conversations were with Charles 
Brown; however, the issue of ratification by those statements 
went to both Charles Brown and BS&H. The court's finding that 
the conversations with Charles Brown were not a ratification of 
the contract occurred after the court had already dismissed 
Charles Brown from the suit. The trial court found insufficient 
evidence at the end of plaintiff's case to find a ratification of 
the contract by the statements of Charles Brown on behalf of 
Charles Brown or BS&H. 
Even if the inconsistent rulings are viewed as two 
separate rulings as argued by Alphagraphics, the trial court 
clearly erred in making inconsistent findings of fact in support 
of its rulings. Even if the two rulings are viewed separate, the 
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testimony is the same and the underlining facts should be 
consistent. Therefore, not only did the trial court make 
inconsistent rulings but made inconsistent findings based upon 
the same undisputed facts. 
For example, the trial court previously found that 
there was no evidence of a retainer or that the money was to be 
paid to plaintiff out of a retainer fee. (Trans. 77-78, 
specifically, lines 10 and 11, pg. 77; and 15 and 16, pg. 78). 
The trial court later found against BS&H based upon the testimony 
of Charles Brown saying that he was not given a big enough 
retainer. (Trans. 144, lines 1 through 4). Thus, at the end of 
plaintiff's case on the first day of trial, the court found that 
Charles Brown was simply acting as a conduit and there was no 
evidence that the money was to be paid out of a retainer. Then 
trial court subsequently found, based upon the same testimony, 
that there was money received in a retainer to be paid to the 
plaintiff for the printing. There is no evidence for this 
finding and it is directly contrary to the court's previous 
finding. This finding is clearly in error and shifts 
responsibility to the firm. This is subject to reversal on 
appeal. 
Alphagraphics realizes that the evidence even 
marshalled in its favor, is insufficient to show ratification of 
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the contract under the facts in this case, and so now, denies 
that the court found ratification, but rather relies on an 
express or implied contract, although it is unclear which.1 
The court made no finding that there was an express 
contract with BS&H. The court could have not made this finding 
on the testimony, as the testimony from both sides was that there 
was no direct oral statement or writing of any kind indicating 
that BS&H would be responsible for the order. To find an express 
contract, the terms must be set forth in writing or express 
words. Bremerton Concrete Products Co., Inc. v. Mylles, 745 P.2d 
1338 (Wash. App. 1987); Eaton v. Engelcke Manufacturing, Inc., 
681 P.2d 1312 (Wash. App. 1984). 
The evidence is insufficient to find an implied 
contract. The elements necessary to recover for an implied 
contract are similar to ratification and are totally unsupported 
1
 BS&H contests that there could not have been a finding of 
an express contract or contract by a direct statement. The court 
specifically ruled as follows: 
Based upon the evidence which we heard, the court finds 
for the plaintiff as against the law firm in that, if 
not direct statement, the law firm entered into this 
contract, they certainly, by their actions, by the 
implication, and by their response after the 
merchandise was delivered, they have accepted this 
contract. (Trans. 144) 
Thus the court relies upon an acceptance of the contract by BS&H. 
The vagueness of these findings were objected to by BS&H in its 
Objections to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
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by the testimony in this case.2 BS&H did not request the work, 
rather the work was requested by the client, Guy Davis; 
Alphagraphics knew the work was for the client and could not 
reasonably expect BS&H to compensate it for the work at the time 
the work was performed; BS&H did not know or have any reason to 
know that it was expected to be liable for the $4,000.00 order; 
and BS&H never retained any benefit from Alphagraphics services 
as the material was delivered directly to the client, Guy Davis. 
Therefore, there can be no finding of an implied contract. 
Furthermore, any finding of an implied contract would 
be precluded because of the express contract established between 
the Plaintiff and the client, Guy Davis of W.C. Winery. Knight 
v. Post, 748 P.2d 1097 (Utah App. 1988). 
Alphagraphic's reference to the American Bar 
Association Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 98 is totally out of 
line. The opinion itself states: 
Absent dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, 
disputes resulting from the failure of an attorney to 
make payment for services rendered by third parties 
should be treated as questions of substantive law, 
2
 The elements of an implied contract are (1) that the 
defendant requested the plaintiff to perform the work; (2) 
plaintiff expected defendant to compensate him; (3) defendant 
knew or should have known that plaintiff expected compensation 
and; (4) under the circumstances it would be unjust for defendant 
to retain the benefit without paying for it. Knight v. Post, 748 
P.2d 1097 (Utah App. 1988); Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah 
App. 1987). 
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which should be examined under traditional contract and 
agency doctrines, rather than questions of the ethical 
propriety of the attorney's actions• 
Therefore, the issue of who should make payment for the 
services rendered in this case should be decided by the 
traditional theories of contract and agency and not an attorneyf s 
ethical obligations as Alphagraphics tries to imply. Under the 
traditional laws of contract and agency, the court cannot find 
BS&H liable for the order. Therefore, judgment against BS&H 
should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT VI 
ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED IN THIS CASE. 
This is not a frivolous appeal without reasonable, 
legal or factual basis as contemplated by Rule 33(a) of the Rules 
of this court. Bachstrom Family Limited Partnership v. Hall, 751 
P.2d 1157 (Utah App. 1988); Monvey v. Maughan, 102 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 
44 (Utah App. 1989). The trial court itself stated that it was a 
hard question and had difficulty finding BS&H liable for the 
order based on a disputed statement that Charles Brown would be 
responsible. (Trans. 76) Furthermore the record clearly shows 
that the trial court made errors in its inconsistent findings and 
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rulings.3 Based upon the foregoing issues presented, this is not 
a frivolous appeal, 
BS&H has not used the legal system for purposes of 
delay but is entitled to the full rights of the legal system as 
provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Alphagraphics is not 
entitled to its attorney's fees in this appeal. 
V-
CONCLUSION 
The evidence and testimony before the trial court is 
insufficient to find a valid contract between BS&H and 
Alphagraphics either express or implied. The evidence is 
insufficient to find a ratification of any alleged contract 
between Alphagraphics and BS&H. 
The trial court made inconsistent rulings and findings 
of fact that are clearly erroneous and reversible error. 
Therefore, the trial court's findings of fact must be set aside 
and the judgment reversed. 
3
 Some of these errors have even been admitted by Plaintiff, 
who now argues that these are harmless errors. (Brief of 
Appellee, pg. 18). 
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